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What is COVID-19, and what do we know so far
about its clinical presentation?
The virus responsible for COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2, is in
the species SARS-like corona viruses. At 125 nm, it is
slightly larger than influenza, SARS and MERS viruses.
It is almost certainly a descendant from a bat corona
virus of which there are many. The closest is a virus that
originated from the Rhinolophus bat which is > 96%
homologous with the current SARS-CoV-2 virus. It is
only 79% homologous with the original SARS CoV [1].
The near identical gene sequences of 90 analysed cases
from outside of China suggests it has likely emerged
after a solitary species jump in early December 2019
from an unknown (likely mammalian) intermediate host
[2]. Pangolins are an endangered ant-eating mammal
from which scientists in Guangzhou have shown a cor-
onavirus with 99% homology, with a receptor binding
domain identical to that of SARS-CoV-2. However, this
has not been confirmed, and, in addition, the pangolin's
rarity means this may not be the only mammal involved.
The symptoms of COVID-19 are fever, dry cough, fa-
tigue, nasal congestion, sore throat and diarrhoea. On
February 14th, the Chinese Center for Disease Control
and Prevention (China CDC) published the first details
of 44,672 confirmed cases, in the biggest study since the
outbreak began [3]. Their findings show that COVID-19
was mild for 81% of patients and had an overall case fa-
tality rate of 2.3%. Of those confirmed cases, only 2.2%
were under 20 years old. Compared to adults, children
generally present with much milder clinical symptoms.
It is likely that future serological studies will show much
asymptomatic disease in children. As opposed to H1N1,
pregnant women do not appear to be at higher risk of
severe disease. The severity of the disease appears to be
associated with age, with the elderly most at risk; those
over 80 years of age had a Case Fatality Rate (CFR) of
14.8%. The CFR was also increased in those with comor-
bidities including cardiovascular, diabetes, chronic re-
spiratory disease, hypertension, and cancer. The cause of
death is respiratory failure, shock or multiple organ
failure.
How are infected people being treated?
There is no proven treatment at this early stage but we
will doubtless have more information about this soon. It
can be assumed that non-pharmacologic approaches are
effective such as fluid support, oxygen and ventilatory sup-
port. Most recently the national data suggests that 17.7%,
10.4% and 7.0% of all cases have disease requiring respira-
tory support in Wuhan, Hubei (not including Wuhan)
and the rest of China (respectively). About a quarter of all
require ventilation while 75% require oxygen support only.
The variation in severity rates probably reflects the out-
comes in an overwhelmed health system. Extra Corporeal
Membrane Oxygenation (ECMO) is potentially of benefit
and we will know more particularly when cities with
higher technology health systems become affected and
ECMO is truly tested in the most severely ill. ECMO is
currently being used in China, however, its effectiveness is
yet to be determined.
Antiviral drugs as well as a variety of other putative
treatments are typically being prescribed for deteriorat-
ing patients on a compassionate basis. Clinicians would
be well aware of such situations but assurance is re-
quired that their safety and efficacy are being scientifically
assessed so that meaning is brought to bear quickly. Co-
ordination of clinical trials to avoid duplication and en-
sure that results are rapidly available will be a challenge
but the case numbers should facilitate rapid definitive
results. (see What is in the pipeline for vaccine develop-
ment and/or therapeutics?).
Why is the World Health Organization (WHO) so
concerned about it?
As a novel virus newly emerged in humans, the world’s
population is completely immune-naïve and therefore
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vulnerable. There is clear human-to-human transmission
in family clusters in China and beyond, transmission
from close face-to-face social contact, especially in small
enclosed spaces, and transmission from failed infection
prevention and control measures in health facilities. In
addition, the experience in Wuhan shows that transmis-
sion can be massive in a short period of time with thou-
sands of new patients diagnosed daily.
The current aim of the global response is to flatten the
epidemic curve so that transmission is slowed, and to
interrupt transmission where possible. While there is
clearly a mortality linked to the virus, the most concern-
ing problem will be if a health system is overwhelmed in
the wake of rapid transmission so that affected patients
cannot receive the care they need. Furthermore, patients
with other urgent medical conditions are at risk of not
obtaining their necessary care. Countries with vulnerable
health systems are particularly of concern.
Recently, there have been outbreaks in newly affected
countries including Italy and Iran where the index case
is unidentified. Furthermore affected countries have very
large clusters emerging such as Korea and Japan. There
is no reason to believe that the global community is
ready for this emerging pandemic; ready in a way that
can see drastic public health intervention implemented
within days, including aggressive and massive contact
tracing, monitoring (or quarantine) and early detection
and isolation in an attempt to slow the progression.
How are health agencies reacting?
There is uncertainty regarding transmissibility and sever-
ity – more information is emerging about the spectrum
of disease, especially mild disease, which is not identified
using many current case definitions, and about the ease
of transmission from person to person. Health agencies
are unsure how to model this and estimates vary de-
pending on the variables being used. For instance, SARS
was essentially spread later in the disease from patients
with more significant clinical pictures, and it was con-
tained by infection control measures particularly in hos-
pitals. The limited spread to family members of health
workers and the community was contained by usual out-
break control measures including early identification
and management of persons with infection, tracing of
contacts with monitoring for onset of fever and/or
symptoms, and active engagement of communities.
Most modelling suggests that the severity of illness is
more like influenza than SARS, and there is concern
among the public health community because the trans-
missibility of COVID-19 is not yet fully understood, and
the potential for it to become endemic like other respira-
tory pathogens is unknown.
Because of the many unknowns, the initial reaction by
health agencies is still valid: to brace for the first wave as
the virus reaches a completely naïve population and to
make maximum effort to interrupt transmission [4, 5].
Experience with managing this outbreak will be very
heterogenous across the world. Countries closely con-
nected with China, such as Singapore, will be ahead in
this regard. As the outbreak moves across regions, there
is opportunity to support those affected later both in
terms of readiness and response. Mechanisms available
to outbreak response organisations, particularly through
the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network
(GOARN), can be valuable in skills- and knowledge-
sharing. Therefore, there should be a deliberate effort to
utilise knowledge from early affected countries in later
affected countries.
What measures are likely to be successful in
curbing its further spread?
On January 23rd, Hubei province in Central China was
locked down with all movement in and out of the prov-
ince blocked. Travel across China was discouraged and
the number of scheduled flights and train journeys avail-
able considerably reduced to perhaps 10% of previous
activity. Commercial and social activities became negli-
gible, with schools, restaurants, other entertainment
spots and most shops closed. Migrant workers were pre-
vented from returning to work after the extended Chin-
ese New Year Holiday. Frequent hand hygiene when in
public and staying at home became the norm. This un-
precedented public health effort by China has afforded
the rest China and the world a lead time to prepare. The
lockdown resulted in a downward trend in national and
provincial epidemic curves, however, these measures are
not sustainable and eventually there will be a strategy to
return to normality. Should this result in a second wave
of cases, and more international spread, countries
around the world must be prepared. Early identification,
and isolation or cohorting of positive cases to designated
sites is at the core. In order to achieve this, hospitals,
quarantine services, laboratories, together with epidemi-
ology and communication teams will need to be scaled
up to provide effective and efficient care.
What is in the pipeline for vaccine development
and/or therapeutics?
It appears that no vaccine will be available for at least one
year, likely a little longer. Phase 1 trials for safety and im-
munogenicity in human populations are likely within 3
months.
In terms of therapeutics there is no known effective
pharmaceutical agent. There are over 200 registered clin-
ical trials registered in China alone. Putative agents in-
clude antivirals; Griffithsin, a spike protein inhibitor,
nucleoside analogues eg. remdesivir, ribavirin and protease
inhibitors such as lopinavir/ritonavir. Immunomodulatory
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and other host targeted agents include interferon, chloro-
quine and immunoglobulins. Corticosteroids will poten-
tially have benefit for immune mediated lung damage late
in the course of disease [6]. Much of the theory stems
from what we have learnt from limited trials in other cor-
ona viruses [7].
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